This paper derives a dynamic cost-bene…t rule for evaluating large projects.
Introduction
Structural transformations occur frequently in real life, such as the replacement of an old road passing through a large number of cities by a large-capacity freeway moving the heavy tra¢ c away from the urban areas. National environmental policy may change by discrete increases in emission taxes of pollutants and decreases in taxes on labor. One intention of such a green tax reform is to create large changes in equilibrium prices. Every time a project is large enough to considerably a¤ect the prices in an economy, the dynamic theory of cost-bene…t analysis for a marginal variation (see Starrett, 1988; and Li and Löfgren, 2008) has to be modi…ed. The general idea behind the necessary modi…cation is not new as it dates back to the French economist Dupuit. However, a satisfactory theory in a growth theoretic context has not been available until recently.
A rigorous theory for dynamic welfare comparisons has been developed by Weitzman (2001) who shows that the di¤erence in intertemporal welfare between two economies or two points in time of the same economy can be exactly measured by the di¤erence in real national income plus a consumer surplus term. In addition, he mentions that the theory may also be used to conduct social cost-bene…t analysis by comparing the welfare levels generated by "twin economies" with identical preferences and technology but di¤erent initial capital stocks. This paper explores this issue further. We show that while the theory is valid for this special case, the cost-bene…t rule for a more general, dynamic project also entails an extra term re ‡ecting the change in capital costs during the project period.
Model setup and the generic cost-bene…t rule
We consider a multisector growth model with all consumption and investment goods taken into account. Let C = (C 1 ; C 2 ; :::; C m ) be a m dimensional vector of consumption ‡ows at time t, which is supposed to exhaust all possible goods and services relevant to social welfare in a …rst best setting. The utilitarian measure of intertemporal welfare at time t = 0 can be expressed as
2 where U (C) is a given concave, non-decreasing, instantaneous utility function with continuous second order derivatives de…ned for C 0, and is the utility rate of discount. Let K = (K 1 ; K 2 ; :::; K n ) be a n dimensional vector of capital goods, which is assumed to contain all types of capital goods in the economy including natural resources and human capital. Net investments are, by de…nition, the change in capital stocks, i.e. I i = _ K i , i = 0; 1; :::; n, which, in vector form can be expressed as I = _ K, given K(0) = K 0 > 0. At each point in time t, consumption C(t) and investment I(t) are allocated within the (m + n) dimensional attainable-possibility set S (K(t); ), conditional on a collection of "parameters", , (Drèze and Stern, 1987) , where the set is assumed to be strictly convex. The parameter may represent any premise that modi…es the feasible set for consumption and investment allocations. The decision-maker is assumed to maximize the current-value Hamiltonian at each t, i.e. H(t) = U (C(t)) + (t)I(t) with respect to fC(t); I(t)g subject to the initial condition and the attainability set, where (t) is the n dimensional vector of the utility prices of capital satisfying the no-arbitrage condition _ = rH K along the optimal trajectory. Let fC( ; t); I( ; t); K( ; t)g be the conditional optimum trajectory, then the maximized intertemporal welfare can be expressed as
Now, consider a project with a change in from a 0 to 1 over a project period t 2 [0; T ], for T 0, which, if implemented, would result in changes in the stream of consumption both within and beyond the project period. The general cost-bene…t rule can be stated as "If the project leads to a positive change in the intertemporal welfare in (2) i.e.
the project is socially pro…table; otherwise not".
A new result
Since the cost-bene…t rule involves an integral over an in…nite time horizon, the project would be rather di¢ cult to evaluate in practice. By using the notion of 3 social pro…t (Dixit et al., 1980) , we show how to transform the rule to a …nite time horizon version and then derive a new dynamic cost-bene…t rule as an extension of Weitzman's twin economy parable. First, we consider a large project as a sequence of marginal projects d to motivate our use of di¤erentials (Starrett, 1988) .
Let C a ( ; t) = @C( ; t)=@ , I ( ; t) = @I( ; t)=@ and K ( ; t) = @K( ; t)=@ denote the changes caused by a marginal project d within the project period t 2 [0; T ]. Then, its net social pro…t at time t can be expressed as
where ( ; t) = rU [C( ; t)] is the utility price of consumption, ( ; t) that of investment, and ( ; t) = _ ( ; t) ( ; t) the cost-of-holding capital. Following
Asheim (2000) and Arrow et al. (2003) , we can now re-express the welfare change in (3) in the following manner:
Lemma 1 The welfare e¤ect due to changes in future consumption as in (3) is equivalent to the present discounted value of social pro…ts within the project period i.e.
, the welfare change in (5) can according to (4) be written as
)dt with C ( ; t) as the optimal consumption path for t 2 [T; 1), conditional on an "initial" capital K( ; T ).
Thus, the second line in (6) becomes
4 which together with the …rst line in (6) constitutes the welfare di¤erence as in (3).
To arrive at a cost-bene…t rule comparable to Starrett (1988, p236-237 ) and
Weitzman (2001), we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The present discounted value of social pro…ts in (5) is equivalent to
where Y (t) = Y 1 (t) Y 0 (t) with Y i (t) = ( i ; t)C( i ; t) + ( i ; t)I( i ; t) as the comprehensive income in situation i = 0; 1. CS(t) = R ( 0 ;t)
consumer surplus with D( ( ; t) ) = C( ; t) as the (compensated) consumption demand system, and
is the cost of capital reallocation at time t.
Proof. Integrating (5) by parts over for the …rst two terms of B( ; t) gives
t)I( ; t)] d dt
De…ning the inverse capital demand function by the vectorD (K( ; t)) = ( ; t), and recalling that ( ; t) = _ ( ; t) ( ; t) and _ K = I. Then, the inner integral in the second line becomes
whereD K is a symmetric matrix following Young's theorem such that the two scalars K D K _ K and _ KD K K are equal to each other. Note that the arguments and t are suppressed here. Thus (8) is true.
These two lemmas imply the following main proposition: This dynamic cost-bene…t rule extends Weitzman's (2001) "twin-economy" parable in two aspects. First, it is applicable to projects of structural reforms over any discrete time period rather than an once-for-all reshu-e in the initial capital. While Weitzman considers the welfare di¤erence between two economies with di¤erent initial capital structure, we are concerned with an economy with a given initial capital but "managed" by two di¤erent regimes. If an alternative regime would result in a higher intertemporal welfare than the base one, then it is worth the e¤ort to shift from the base regime to the alternative one. Second, we obtain an extra term (t) re ‡ecting the cost of capital reallocation in addition to the income di¤erence and consumer surplus terms. Weitzman's comparison of twin economies can in our framework be interpreted as a project that can costlessly and instantaneously transform the initial capital composition. His reason is sound since the cost of the transformation is "sunk cost". We explicitly take into account the cost of capital reallocation. More exactly, by treating Weitzman's parable as a permanent project over t 2 [0; 1), with lim T !1 exp ( T ) = 0, we can use (10) to derive the following version of our formula
as 
A money-metric analogy
To convert the welfare measure in (8) from utility to a money metric, we …rst de…ne the nominal prices by P( ; t) = ( ; t)= ( ; t) and Q( ; t) = ( ; t)= ( ; t), where ( ; t) is the marginal utility of income satisfying the no-arbitrage condition _ ( ; t) = ( ; t)(r( ; t) ) with r( ; t) as the nominal interest rate. Next, we de…ne the real prices by P( ; t) = P( ; t)= ( ; t) and Q( ; t) = Q( ; t)= ( ; t) with ( ; t) as Weitzman's ideal consumer price index
whereP( ; t) denotes the market clearing prices conditional on , for consuming the pre-project bundle C( 0 ; t). By the assumption of an invariant utility function U (C), we have rU (C( 0 ; t)) = ( 0 ; t)P( 0 ; t) = ( ; t)P( ; t) = rU (C( ; t)), for all C( ; t) = C( 0 ; t), which implies that ( ; t) ( ; t) = ( 0 ; t). In present value terms, this last equality becomes ( ; t) ( ; t) exp( t) = ( 0 ; t) exp( t) = ( 0 ; 0) exp( R t 0 r(s)ds) due to the no-arbitrage condition, where r(t) = r( 0 ; t) _ ( 0 ; t)= ( 0 ; t) is the pre-project real interest rate at time t. Thus, the moneymetric welfare change corresponding to (8) can be expressed as
where
D( P)d P the consumer surplus, and (t) = r(t) R 1 A usual practice in cost-bene…t analysis is to assume a constant marginal utility of income.
However, Starrett (1988) shows that this is in general not consistent with utilitarian theory.
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Conclusion
This paper has derived a dynamic cost-bene…t rule for large projects from a multisector growth model, conditionally optimal for a given collection of parameters.
As in Drèze and Stern (1987) , we de…ne a project as the change in the parameter in a given time period, involving changes in consumption, investment and capital stocks over time. By examining the change in the present value of net social profits, we …nd that the dynamic cost-bene…t rule entails an extra term involving the cost of capital reallocation, in addition to the conventional income plus consumer surplus terms in Weitzman (2001) . This cost component should be relevant for any large investment project that accumulates capital over time.
6 References
